This paper exploits the 2008-09 stamp duty holiday in the United Kingdom to estimate the incidence of a transaction tax on housing. We …nd that there was an average reduction in the post-tax sale price of around $900, out of an average tax reduction of about $1500. Under the new tax regime, the increase in transactions of properties a¤ected by the stamp duty holiday was about 8%, though most of this e¤ect was rapidly reversed after the policy was withdrawn. We calibrate these …ndings to a bargaining model and show this implies that about sixty percent of the surplus generated by the holiday accrued to buyers. Using this model, we also estimate an upper bound for the deadweight loss of the tax at around 4% of the revenue raised.
Introduction
Transactions taxes, especially on real estate, are an important source of government revenues. A wide range of countries levy such taxes on property and proposals abound to extend their domain to a range of …nancial transactions. 1 One key question is who ends up paying it, the classical incidence question. 2 Although the tax is remitted by the buyer, we would expect it to be a part of the negotiation over the price. 3 In practice, the bargaining protocols associated with bargaining over real estate in this context are complex -see, for example, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) . Following the extensive experimental literature on bargaining and experiments, see for example Roth (1995) , we would expect some kind of surplus sharing. Indeed ultimatum games frequently lead to surplus sharing, especially among inexperienced bargainers. 4 Another important issue is how the tax a¤ects transactions as this determines the ine¢ ciency created by the tax. While there is a sizeable literature on standard property taxes levied on owners or tenants, see for example Zodrow (2001) , relatively little but growing attention has been paid to the incidence of transactions taxes on property.
As a form of taxation, stamp duties have a long history in the United 1 The U.K. is not unusual in taxing property transactions. Such taxes exist in Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and the U.S. (see for instance Oxley and Ha¤ner, 2010) . In the latter, taxes vary by state (see Federation of Tax Administrators, 2006). 2 See Kotliko¤ and Summers (1987) for a summary of the older tax incidence literature. 3 Some U.S. states appear to have developed conventions on this, assigning tax payments …fty-…fty to buyers and sellers but this does not imply that this is the …nal incidence as buyers and sellers can still bargain in the shadow of this rule. 4 In a wide-ranging meta-study, Engel (2011) …nds that on average individuals give a little over 40% in the classic ultimatum game using a sample of over 600 laboratory studies. $1500 on the median transaction to which it applied. We use the stamp duty holiday to construct treatment and control groups by using two facts.
First, the tax change was announced on the day immediately before its introduction, making its timing largely unanticipated. 5 Second, for a signi…cant fraction of our dataset, we observe an independent valuation of the house by an approved mortgage surveyor which is demanded by lenders as a condition of granting a mortgage. This valuation re ‡ects the resale value of the property in the event of default and we would not expect it to re ‡ect the holiday:
resale after default would almost certainly occur, if at all, after the tax holiday had ended. Thus, this independent valuation can be used to assign a property to the treatment group.
We estimate the average reduction in the post tax price of a house trans- 5 Political leaks and media speculation may have led to some form of anticipation for which we control using an independent database on media citations among the most widely circulated British newspapers. We come back to this issue in section two.
acted during the holiday window to be around $900 and we show that this …nding is robust to a variety of speci…cations and robustness checks. We also …nd that housing transactions in the relevant price window increased by around 8%. But this e¤ect is estimated to be insigni…cant if we exclude the months immediately before and after the holiday end, thereby suggesting that the signi…cant rise in purchases during the window was -at least partiallycompensated by a signi…cant fall afterwards. This suggests that most of the e¤ect on volumes was due to a change in the timing of transactions.
To give these e¤ects an economic interpretation, we present a simple bargaining model of house price determination. This allows us to decompose the e¤ect of the tax holiday into a term which re ‡ects the distribution of bargaining power between buyers and sellers and a selection term re ‡ecting the fact that the tax a¤ects which transactions take place during the tax holiday. We show how our estimated e¤ects can be used to identify these components separately. This is because bargaining power does not a¤ect whether a transaction happens. We …nd that buyers were able, on average, to capture about sixty percent of the tax saving during the holiday window.
The model can also be used to give a back of the envelope sense of the welfare cost of raising revenues via levying stamp duty on housing transactions. tax generated a 15% decline in transaction volumes in the Toronto area, a decline in sale prices about equal to the tax and a welfare loss of about $1 for every $8 in tax revenue.
Another stream of research analyse the distortions on the house price distribution introduced by di¤erent aspects of the tax system in the United States and United Kingdom. Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2012) report evidence of manipulative sorting around the price notch, but not around the time notch, generated by a reform in Washington D.C. on residential real estate transfer taxes. Kopczuk and Munroe (2013) study the incidence of a tax on houses transacted above $1 million in the states of New York and New Jersey. Exploiting the discontinuity on the overall tax liability associated with the so-called 1% 'mansion tax'and the consequential bunching of transactions just below that threshold, they …nd that most of the surplus generated by the tax accrues to sellers. While sharing the emphasis on tax incidence, we look at a rather di¤erent segment of the market, namely houses transacted in the range £ 125,000-£ 175,000 and rely on a tax holiday as source of exogenous variation.
The paper most closely related to our analysis is Best and Kleven (2013) who exploit several discontinuities in the U.K. stamp duty system of tax liability to estimate the impact of a …scal stimulus in the housing market on the aggregate economy. Using the universe of transactions available from the Land Registry o¢ ce, they provide strong evidence of bunching just below the thresholds that trigger a higher rate on the whole sale price and estimate signi…cant, but short-lived, e¤ects of the 2008-09 tax holiday on real activity.
Our analysis, in contrast, focuses on the incidence of the surplus generated by the tax holiday (and the associated welfare gain) using an empirical strategy that, while controlling for notches and missing transactions in the distribution of sale prices, is based on surveyor's valuations.
Data and policy design
We use a dataset on mortgage transactions from the main …nancial regulator in the UK, the formerly Financial Services Authority (FSA), now Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). It is compiled from mortgage lenders' returns which are submitted to the FSA/PRA for regulatory purposes. The dataset includes characteristics of the mortgage loan at origination such as the loan size, the date at which the mortgage is issued, the purchase price of mortgaged property and, for signi…cant portion of the transactions, an independent surveyor valuation of the property. It also includes borrower characteristics such as the age of the main borrower, the total household income on which the mortgage advance is based, the previous tenure of the household. We also know the region in which the house was purchased. SDLT works on a 'slab' -band and varying rate structure -basis. The SDLT rate for the band within which a transaction value falls is imposed on the buyer and applies to the entire purchase price, including elements within lower bands. 6 With the marginal rate of SDLT applying to the entire purchase, discontinuities are generated around the thresholds to each band in the UK tax system. In the full FSA/PRA sample, around 25% of property transactions are between $125; 000, the lower threshold above which SDLT 7 The tax relief o¤ered 6 The gap between taxes owned and taxes paid to Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on housing transactions is about 4-5% of the true tax liability, a value lower than the estimates for other UK taxes (Best and Kleven, 2013) . This suggests that tax evasion is likely to be limited in this market. 7 In the government March 2010 budget, the lower threshold for …rst time buyers was lifted to $250; 000 until 24 th March 2012. To control for policy as well as non-policy factors a¤ecting this segment of the market, we will add a dummy for …rst-time buyers in all speci…cations. The results below are robust to ending our sample in March 2010.
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was 1% of the total purchase price. All higher SDLT rates and bands were left unchanged. The sample is restricted to observations where the mortgage is de…ned as being for house purchase, and where there is both a purchase price and a surveyor price indicated. For the purposes of assessing the incidence of the stamp duty, we focus on purchasers whose houses were associated with a surveyor's valuation between $125; 000 and $174; 999. More speci…cally, we will compare the change in their post-tax transactions price associated with the SDLT holiday to the change in the transaction price for two groups which, according to the surveyor's valuation, are either in the $100; 000-$124; 999 or in the $175; 000-$200; 000 tax bracket throughout our sample, and therefore did not bene…t from the tax holiday. By using the surveyor's valuation, we avoid selecting on our endogenous variable, the transaction price. By looking also at transactions in the segments of the housing market with sale prices immediately above and below the price range targeted by the …scal intervention, we are able to control for seasonal and common factors that are likely to a¤ect transactions on a range of relatively similar properties, at least as measured by their surveyor's valuation. These will naturally lead to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence interpretation of the estimates presented in this paper. To minimize the impact of outliers, we also exclude transactions with post-tax purchase price outside the range $100; 000-$200; 000 as well as transactions in the top 0:1 percentile of the distribution of percentage deviation between surveyor's valuation and purchase price. 9 Altogether, these restrictions give us a sample size of around 315; 000 observations, which are summarized in Table 1 according to whether each of the three groups is observed during or outside the holiday period.
Summary Statistics
A number of interesting features emerges from the descriptive statistics in Table 1 . First, there seems to be little systematic variation in the mean and standard deviation of surveyor's valuations in each group across the two periods. This is consistent with the idea that surveyors were ignoring the short term impact of the stamp duty holiday on transactions prices since, in the event of default, it would almost certainly be the case that the house would be sold beyond the stamp duty holiday window.
Second, in all groups, the average surveyor's valuation is very close to the average pre-tax purchase price. This result, however, may be driven from the fact that only in one quarter of the sample observations the surveyor's valuation di¤ers from the purchase price. In Figure 4 , we report the distribution of the di¤erence between surveyor and purchase prices as a percentage of the purchase price outside of (top panel) and during (bottom panel) the holiday period, only for those transactions in which the two di¤er. For more than 80% of the distribution, surveyor valuations appear evenly distributed in the 10% neighborhood around the purchase price.
Third, the post-tax purchase price for transactions in the range [$125; 000, $175; 000) occurred during the holiday period is, on average, about $550
lower than the average post-tax purchase price for the same group of transactions which occurred six months either way of the new policy regime. On the other hand, the average pre-tax purchase price for this group during the holiday period is about $300 higher than the average pre-tax price paid outside the holiday. Fifth, in all groups there seems to be su¢ cient variation in post-tax purchase price, whose conditional means are the focus of our empirical analysis.
Sixth, during the stamp duty holiday, the volume of house transactions per month in the range [$125; 000, $175; 000) increased, on average, by about 100 units at the regional level, corresponding to a 14% rise relative to the non-holiday period. This contrasts with the other two groups which experienced no signi…cant increase over the policy intervention period. Using Figure 3 , we can see that this corresponded to a 10% surge of the entire market (i.e. irrespective of the surveyor price). Our dataset is supplemented by a set of monthly macroeconomic data that will serve to control for regional conditions.
Bunching
A key feature of stamp duty is that it creates a notch in the tax schedule. A number of recent contributions including Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2012), Kopczuk and Munroe (2013) and Best and Kleven (2013) show that the dis-continuity imposed by the type of housing transaction tax changes considered in this paper generate (i) a notch in the sale distribution immediately before the thresholds that trigger an higher rate on the whole transaction price and
(ii) a hole of missing transactions immediately after that. Indeed, Kopczuk
and Munroe (2013) show on U.S. data that this bunching e¤ect can extend into the sale price distribution as far as 10% of the threshold value.
In this section, we develop an analysis similar to Best and Kleven (2013) to show a similar pattern in our data. In the context of our analysis, bunching represents a serious concern as it may contaminate the composition of the treatment and control groups. To deal with this, we follow two incrementally conservative strategies. First, we restrict our sample only to transactions that did not occur in the $10; 000 neighborhood of either the $125; 000 or $175; 000 thresholds. In other words, our baseline speci…cations run on three groups of transactions in the range: for which we observe below-threshold bunching in line with the evidence in Figure 5 . The latter strategy will guard against the possibility that bunching extended further than $10; 000 from the threshold value into the sale price distribution.
Estimating the e¤ect of a tax holiday
We now present the core results of the paper which estimate the impact of the stamp-duty holiday on prices and transactions. We begin with a sparse core speci…cation to which we add sequentially national and regional characteristics to control for business cycle developments. We also assess the extent of any possible time-variation in the average e¤ect of the stamp duty holiday on transaction prices and volumes.
Transaction prices
We consider the impact of the stamp duty holiday on the post-tax purchase price for transaction i in month s denoted by P is , where s incudes all months To estimate the average price e¤ect, we run di¤erent versions of the following basic regression:
where D is refers to household-speci…c demographic characteristics, such as log age, squared log age and a dummy for whether the transaction involved a …rst-time buyer. The vector of regional factors, R rs [HP rs ; U rs ; Z r ], includes house price in ‡ation based on the Halifax House Price Index, HP rs , the claimant count unemployment rate, U rs , and a full set of region-speci…c dummies, Z r . Standard errors are adjusted for intra-regional correlation.
Column (1) in Table 2 presents estimates for the baseline speci…cation where we do not include national or regional controls. We …nd that the 1% stamp-duty reduction associated with the holiday period lowered the posttax price by 0:53%. According to our estimates, this translates into a sale price change on the average transaction of around minus $830, a value in line with the …gures in Table 1 . Column (2) replaces the holiday period dummy with a full set of month …xed-e¤ects. Column (3) adds controls for regional factors. These speci…cations lead to similar estimates for both the elasticity 1 , now around minus 0:58%, and the implied nominal price change, now about minus $860. All of the estimates in columns (1) Column (4) shows the results using the 'anticipation' restricted sample and …nds a slightly higher point estimate of minus 0:66% or minus $1000. On the other hand, column (5) reveals a smaller e¤ect when we exclude the …rst two months of the holiday window, suggesting that buyers bene…tted most in transactions agreed before the policy intervention but completed afterwards.
In column (6) and (7), we exclude observations in the two month window before ('end notch') and after ('end hole') the deadline of 31 st December 2009.
While both speci…cations reveal some variation relative to the richest baseline speci…cation in column (3), these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant.
Finally, in column (8), we exclude the two months either side of both the holiday start and the holiday end dates. These restrictions are meant to purge further our treatment and control groups by removing any residual bunching e¤ect not fully captured by the $10; 000 exclusion restrictions around the $125; 000 and $175; 000 thresholds. Reassuringly, the estimates in column (8) are in line with the rest of the results.
Taken together, these results suggest a robust negative e¤ect of the stamp duty holiday on house prices with an average magnitude of around minus $900 across all speci…cations. In section four, we will discuss how these coe¢ cients can be interpreted through the lens of a simple bargaining model to provide an estimate of the tax incidence.
Temporal heterogeneity. We now look for evidence of time-variation in the e¤ect of the tax change. In particular, we are interested in seeing whether the estimated price e¤ect is in ‡uenced by strategic considerations as the tax holiday nears its end. To investigate this, we run a regression in which the dummy variable 'treatment'is replaced by a full set of interaction terms between the month …xed-e¤ects during the holiday period and the group dummy for transactions with surveyor's valuation in the range [$135; 000, $165; 000). We also include interaction terms between the dummy for this group and the month …xed-e¤ects outside the holiday period, but we have veri…ed that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of a single groupspeci…c dummy for all non-holiday months.
The …ndings from this exercise are reported in Figure 6 in the form of horizontal lines spanning the 95% con…dence band associated with the estimates of the monthly treatment e¤ects. As we have already discussed, the …rst months of the holiday period are likely dominated by transactions whose purchase price was agreed prior to the government announcement but that were completed after the holiday began, thereby generating a windfall for the buyer. More generally, there is a slight tendency for the price e¤ect to decline over time, especially towards the end of the holiday. But none of the monthly e¤ects is statistically di¤erent from another, nor from the time-invariant price e¤ect associated with the speci…cation in column (3) and whose 95% con…dence band is depicted by vertical red lines in Figure 6 .
Transaction volumes
To examine the e¤ect of the stamp-duty holiday on transactions volumes, we aggregate our data at the regional level, for each surveyor valuation bracket group and month. We then regress the log of the number of transactions N rgs in region r for the surveyor valuation bracket group g observed during month s on the same type of dummies used in the price speci…cation (1), including the interaction term between the dummy for the holiday period and the dummy for the transaction group with surveyor valuations in the range [$135; 000, $165; 000) for region r, which is denoted as treatment rgs .
We also include a full set of region-speci…c variables to yield:
where 2 and 3 are vectors and Z rs [HP rs ; U rs ]. The speci…cation also include regional …xed e¤ects, r0 . Standard errors are adjusted for intraregional correlation.
The increase in housing transaction volumes associated with the SDLT holiday period is estimated to be, on average, around 8% per region in the most general speci…cation with a full set of month …xed-e¤ects in column (3) of Table 2 . The estimates are slightly larger in the restricted samples that exclude the possibility of anticipation or completion e¤ects. But the sharpest di¤erences emerge in the last three columns. More speci…cally, the estimated elasticities in columns (6) and (7), associated with the restricted samples that drop either the two months before or after the 31 December 2009 deadline respectively, tend to be lower than in the previous columns.
These restrictions are meant to evaluate the extent to which the activity boost generated by the housing …scal stimulus was concentrated in the …nal months of the holiday period and then swiftly reversed soon after the policy was withdrawn: the evidence suggests so. The latter …nding becomes even more apparent in column (8) where the simultaneous exclusion of the two months either side of both holiday start and holiday end leads to an insigni…cant 2:6% volume increase. However, note that we also cannot reject the hypothesis that the e¤ect in column (8) is the same as that in column (3).
Temporal heterogeneity. To investigate further the extent of timevariation in the volume e¤ect, we run a regression that is similar to (2) but with the variable treatment being replaced by an interaction between month …xed-e¤ects during the holiday period and the dummy for the group with surveyor valuations in the range $135; 000 to $165; 000. In keeping with the analysis for sale prices, we also include interaction terms between the monthly dummies for the non-holiday period and the dummy for the intermediate sale price group, though also here this is not crucial for our …ndings.
The results are displayed in Figure 7 and cover (in the same format of Figure 6 ) each holiday month. Unlike Figure 6 , however, we also report January 2010 in Figure 7 since this is the …rst month after the stamp duty holiday was withdrawn. 10 Consistent with the …ndings in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2 Table 2 are displayed as red vertical lines in Figure 7 .
Interpretation and Welfare Analysis
The e¤ects that we estimated above are reduced form impacts and it is unclear how to map them into anything of economic signi…cance. In this section, we discuss how the reduced form results can be interpreted using a generalized Nash bargaining model. This approach suggests a natural way of estimating the welfare loss (excess burden) from the stamp duty.
While it might be tempting to infer the incidence of the stamp duty holiday directly from the estimates of equation (1), this is problematic. To see why, recall from Table 2 that housing transactions increased. And these are housing transactions that would not have taken place had the holiday not been in place. Thus, they are not a random sample of houses within the treatment window. This point emerges more clearly from the theoretical model that we present which also suggests a way of mapping the reduced form estimates in (1) and (2) into interpretable e¤ects.
The Bargaining Model
Consider a world where a buyer and a seller are matched. The buyer's valuation of the seller's house is V . We denote the transaction price agreed by a buyer and seller as p. The stamp duty rate is 2 f0; tg. The seller's valuation of the house is u.
Suppose that buyer and seller bargain over the price and that the outcome is generated by a generalized Nash bargaining solution where 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of the net surplus that accrues to the buyer. Then, the bargain struck will pick the price that maximizes:
Maximizing (3) with respect to p yields the following standard formula for the post-tax price:
Now write the di¤erence between buyer's and seller's valuation as
This is a measure of the potential gain from trade, i.e. " is idiosyncratic variation which means that the buyer values the house more or less than the seller. Using this, (4) can be rewritten as:
We see from equation (5) that the tax term is multiplied by which determines how far the tax increases the (gross) price.
Stamp duty prevents transactions that would otherwise be worthwhile from taking place. Trade takes place only if:
i.e. the buyer values the house su¢ ciently more than the seller to overcome the need to pay a transaction cost in the form of a tax. Let G ( ) be the distribution of " in the population of interest.
Now consider the impact of a tax holiday where we divide observations in the population of buyers and sellers into a treatment group, T , and a control group, C where:
The e¤ect on the price across the population of buyers and seller is
tE fu : = tg
and the e¤ect on transactions from tax holiday is given by
where expectations in both cases are taken with respect to u. Equations (7) and (8) are estimated in Table 2 . An important observation is that only (7) depends on .
Calibration Method
The key assumption that allows us to make a structure interpretation of the coe¢ cients is that:
This says that sellers'valuations of houses available during the window do not change. This will allow us to attribute all changes in prices due to demand rather than supply side factors. Thus, the subsequent interpretation o¤ered is only valid under this maintained hypothesis which can be thought of as an identifying assumption. Next observe that
This re ‡ects the fact that some transactions which were deterred by the stamp duty take place during the window. Our results on transactions suggest that this term is positive and we can use the transactions coe¢ cient to estimate the size of this e¤ect.
We now have:
The …rst term re ‡ects surplus sharing and the second is the selection e¤ect due to additional transactions taking place during the holiday period. To explain our method, we take the point estimate of (9) from column (3) of Table 2 , minus 859, and use it as our benchmark. But we will also assess the robustness of the …ndings to looking across the 95% con…dence intervals for these coe¢ cients.
Bargaining Power
To estimate , we need to measure the second term in (9) . We will do this by assuming that the distribution of the idiosyncratic valuation, ", is normal with standard deviation . In this case:
We can estimate by evaluating this at the mean of u and using (8) . Observe then that from the most general speci…cation in column 3 of Panel B in Table   2 with month …xed-e¤ects, we have that: It is then straightforward to compute the point estimate of the selection term in (9) as:
with the 95% con…dence set ranging from $37 to $220. 11 Using the value in (10), our estimate of the average bargaining power of the buyer is then:
= 859 + 62 1492 + 62 = 59:3%
Moreover, the surplus share appears precisely estimated with a standard error of 11:1%. This says that the buyer captures close to two thirds of the value of the tax holiday, on average, after adjusting for the "selection" e¤ect. We repeat this exercise for the whole range of estimated values in Panels A and B and report the outcomes in Panel C of Table 2 . The point estimates of the share being captured by the buyer range from 55% to 68%.
However, they are not statistically di¤erent from one another suggesting that an estimate of around 60% is a reasonable interpretation of the results.
Welfare E¤ects
The bargaining model also allows us to estimate a back-of-envelope welfare cost associated with the stamp duty. To do this observe that total welfare of those who own or buy houses aggregated across the population is
In the 95% con…dence interval, the estimates of range from where p (t) solves (4) and " is the highest individual valuation in the 1% tax bracket. The revenue raised is:
Then de…ne the cost of public funds, , associated with a stamp duty rate of t from:
i.e. the shadow value of public spending that would be needed to justify levying a tax rate of t. In our case where t = 1%, we have that
So for every pound of tax revenue raised, there is a 4% welfare loss. 12 The range of estimates in the 95% con…dence bands for the coe¢ cient is 1:02% to 1:15%.
For the purposes of this exercise, we have used the transaction e¤ect from Table 2 column (3). But the fact that there is a large fall in transaction volumes post-holiday ( Figure 7 ) may suggest that this short-run transactions e¤ect may be an upper bound for considering the long-run deadweight loss.
However, it would also be premature to conclude that a long-run elasticity of zero constitutes a more reasonable estimate given the amount of noise that the end of the window could bring to the timing of transactions. The main story should be that even the short-run e¤ects that we estimate suggest a rather low elasticity and hence deadweight loss associated with the stamp duty. And recent e¤orts by the UK government to signi…cantly increase stamp duty rates on high value properties certainly seem predicated on such beliefs. 13 
Conclusions
This paper has looked at the incidence of a housing transaction tax in the U.K. exploiting the fact that the government o¤ered a temporary unanticipated tax holiday to a particular segment of the market. With access to both the transactions price and the value of the house as reported by an independent valuer, we are able to construct a natural treatment group to identify the e¤ect of the holiday.
The results provide consistent evidence that a reasonable account of the tax incidence is that the "surplus" created by the tax holiday accrued, on average, for about sixty percent to the buyers. We also found evidence that activity was boosted during the tax holiday window with a signi…cant, though short-lived, increase of some 8% in transaction volumes for houses a¤ected by the policy intervention.
While the context of our study is speci…c, it provides a benchmark study for other cases where transactions taxes are in place. As with any tax, there is a question of how far it deters transactions. The evidence from the stamp duty holiday in the UK …nds a sizeable behavioral response in prices and quantities. This gives food for thought in debates to extend the domain of transactions taxes into other areas, not least in the area of …nancial transactions. 13 The estimated transaction volume elasticities and hence welfare costs are a good deal lower than those in Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012). This makes sense for cases where -like in their paper-the decision being studied is the choice of residential location as a function of taxes. 2[135000,165000) transacted during the holiday period, whose coe¢ cient is 1 ( 1 ). Column 2 adds month …xed-e¤ects. Column 3 adds regional house price and claimant counts. Column 4 (5) excludes the two months before (after) the start of the stamp duty holiday. Column 6 (7) excludes the two months before (after) the end of the stamp duty holiday. Column 8 excludes the two months either way of both holiday start and end. All speci…cations in Panel B include regional …xed e¤ects. **(*) denotes signi…cant values at the 5% (10%) con…dence level. Standard errors adjust for intra-regional correlation. House prices (right-hand scale) (a) Percentage change three months on three months earlier Credible sets for the average price di¤erence by month (in %s) are obtained from an estimated model with regional controls, month …xed-e¤ects for the full sample and month-…xed e¤ects speci…c to the treatment group. Horizontal axes refer to the month-speci…c percent price change for the treatment group during the holiday period. The vertical lines correspond to the 95% credible set for the average price e¤ect of the holiday period using regional controls and month-…xed e¤ects (column 3 in Table 2 ). tained from an estimated model with regional controls, month …xed-e¤ects for the full sample and month-…xed e¤ects speci…c to the treatment group. Horizontal axes refer to the month-speci…c volume percent change for the treatment group during the holiday period. The vertical lines correspond to the 95% credible set for the average volume e¤ect of the holiday period using regional controls and month-…xed e¤ects (column 3 in Table 2 ).
